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The UID type is used instead. */ typedef UIDType ProbableCauseType; /** Proposed Repair Actions are sets of unique identifiers. */ typedef UIDSetType ProposedRepairActionSetType; /** Security Alarm Causes are unique identifiers. */ typedef UIDType SecurityAlarmCauseType; /** Security Alarm Detector can indicate either a mechanism or a specific object. (...) Two nulls may be sent if the managed system does not support this property. @member mechanism the scheme or function detecting the alarm, may be null @member obj the object detecting the alarm, may be null */ struct SecurityAlarmDetectorType { UIDType mechanism; // may be null NameType obj; // may be null }; /** Service User @member id the id of the service user @member details details about the service user, type will depend on id */ struct ServiceUserType { UIDType id; any details; // value will depend on id }; /** Service Providers share the same representation as Service Users. */ typedef ServiceUserType ServiceProviderType; /** Specific Problems are sets of unique identifiers. */ typedef UIDSetType SpecificProblemSetType; /** A Stop Time Type is used to indicate when some function should cease. (...) X.721 appears to restrict the "cleared" value on this alarm but clears should be allowed. @param securityAlarmDetector @param serviceUser @param serviceProvider */ void integrityViolation ( in ExternalTimeType eventTime, in NameType source, in ObjectClassType sourceClass, in NotifIDType notificationIdentifier, in CorrelatedNotificationSetType correlatedNotifications, in AdditionalTextType additionalText, in AdditionalInformationSetType additionalInfo, in SecurityAlarmCauseType securityAlarmCause, in PerceivedSeverityType securityAlarmSeverity, in SecurityAlarmDetectorType securityAlarmDetector, in ServiceUserType serviceUser, in ServiceProviderType serviceProvider ); /** An Object Creation notification is used to report the creation of a managed object to another open system.
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Score: 1060871.3 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ.../x780/2001-amd1/itut_x780.html
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NOTE – Examples of resources include servers, operating systems, networks, software, applications and storage equipment. 3.1.3 customer [b-ITU-T M.60]: An entity which receives services offered by a service provider based on a contractual relationship. It may include the role of a network user. 3.1.4 customer unit [b-ITU-T H.626]: A device located at the customer part of a visual surveillance system and used to present multimedia information (such as audio, video, image, alarm signal, etc.) to the end user. 3.1.5 mobile customer unit (M_CU) [b-ITU-T H.626.1]: Mobile client software installed in a customer's mobile devices. The M_CU is used to initiate the service and provide customers with video viewing. 3.1.6 premises unit [b-ITU-T H.626]: A device located at the remote part of a visual surveillance system and used to capture multimedia information (such as audio, video, image, alarm signal, etc.) from a surveilled object. 3.1.7 visual surveillance [b-ITU-T H.626]: A telecommunication service focusing on video (but including audio) application technology, which is used to remotely capture multimedia (such as audio, video, image, alarm signals, etc.) and present them to the end user in a user-friendly manner, based on a managed broadband network with ensured quality, security and reliability. 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation None. 4 Abbreviations and acronyms This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: CU Customer Unit IVS Intelligent Visual Surveillance MCU Mobile Customer Unit MSU Media Storage Unit PU Premises Unit VS Visual Surveillance VSCC Visual Surveillance Cloud Computing 762     765     766     767     768     769     770     771     772     773     774     775          
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Score: 1060822.7 - https://www.itu.int/en/publica.../files/basic-html/page770.html
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This could happen e.g. during a power -- cut in a small NE which does not have battery backup for the real time clock. reinitialized ProbableCause ::= localValue:158 -- A processing error alarm to be issued after the system has reinitialised. This will indicate -- to the management systems that the view they have of the managed system may no longer -- be valid. Usage example: The managed -- system issues this alarm after a reinitialization with severity warning to inform the -- management system about the event.
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Score: 1058875.2 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ...md8/ASN1DefinedTypesModule.asn
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This could happen e.g. during a power -- cut in a small NE which does not have battery backup for the real time clock. reinitialized ProbableCause ::= localValue:158 -- A processing error alarm to be issued after the system has reinitialised. This will indicate -- to the management systems that the view they have of the managed system may no longer -- be valid. Usage example: The managed -- system issues this alarm after a reinitialization with severity warning to inform the -- management system about the event.
Language:English
Score: 1058875.2 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ...md7/ASN1DefinedTypesModule.asn
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This could happen e.g. during a power -- cut in a small NE which does not have battery backup for the real time clock. reinitialized ProbableCause ::= localValue:158 -- A processing error alarm to be issued after the system has reinitialised. This will indicate -- to the management systems that the view they have of the managed system may no longer -- be valid. Usage example: The managed -- system issues this alarm after a reinitialization with severity warning to inform the -- management system about the event.
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Score: 1058875.2 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ...d8/ASN1DefinedTypesModule.html
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This could happen e.g. during a power -- cut in a small NE which does not have battery backup for the real time clock. reinitialized ProbableCause ::= localValue:158 -- A processing error alarm to be issued after the system has reinitialised. This will indicate -- to the management systems that the view they have of the managed system may no longer -- be valid. Usage example: The managed -- system issues this alarm after a reinitialization with severity warning to inform the -- management system about the event.
Language:English
Score: 1058875.2 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ...995/ASN1DefinedTypesModule.asn
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This could happen e.g. during a power -- cut in a small NE which does not have battery backup for the real time clock. reinitialized ProbableCause ::= localValue:158 -- A processing error alarm to be issued after the system has reinitialised. This will indicate -- to the management systems that the view they have of the managed system may no longer -- be valid. Usage example: The managed -- system issues this alarm after a reinitialization with severity warning to inform the -- management system about the event.
Language:English
Score: 1058875.2 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ...d7/ASN1DefinedTypesModule.html
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This could happen e.g. during a power -- cut in a small NE which does not have battery backup for the real time clock. reinitialized ProbableCause ::= localValue:158 -- A processing error alarm to be issued after the system has reinitialised. This will indicate -- to the management systems that the view they have of the managed system may no longer -- be valid. Usage example: The managed -- system issues this alarm after a reinitialization with severity warning to inform the -- management system about the event.
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Score: 1058875.2 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/Publ...95/ASN1DefinedTypesModule.html
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H.323 Series Implementers Guide - January 2004 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION ITU-T G.874 Implementers’ Guide TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU (27 May 2005) SERIES G: TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS AND MEDIA, DIGITAL SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS Implementers’ Guide for ITU-T Rec. (...) M.3100: ( Aggregate audible/visual indicators; ( Alarm reporting; ( Alarm report control interval; ( Alarm reporting control; ( Inhibited; ( Managed entity; ( Managed resource; ( Managed resource-specific; ( Management interface; ( Persistence interval; ( Qualified problem; ( Reset threshold report; ( Threshold report; ( Timed interval; ( Unit audible/visual indicator. 3.12 The following terms are defined in ITU-T Rec. M.3100: ( Aggregate audible/visual indicators; ( Alarm reporting; ( Alarm report control interval; ( Alarm reporting control; ( Inhibited; ( Managed entity; ( Managed resource; ( Managed resource-specific; ( Management interface; ( Persistence interval; ( Qualified problem; ( Reset threshold report; ( Threshold report; ( Timed interval; ( Unit audible/visual indicator. 3.13 The following term is defined in ITU-T Rec.
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Score: 1056831.6 - https://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/com15/implgd/g874ig_ww9.doc
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Faber Maunsell Security aspects in the construction and maintenance of infrastructures of the inland transport sector Richard Harris Director Intelligent Transport Systems Faber Maunsell - AECOM UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Security Principles − Deterrence – Keep the bad guys out; make it easier for them to go elsewhere − Detection – If they do get in, make sure you know about it − Assessment – Once something happens, know what is unfolding − Response – Be able respond appropriately and manage the result UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Major events − March 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack − July 1995 Paris subway bombing − February 2004 Moscow subway bombing − March 2004 Madrid train system bombings − July 2005 London underground and bus bombings UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Infrastructure Security Challenges − Transportation systems, by their nature, invite public access − Roadways and rail systems are spread across the landscape − Distances can make response times long − Information networks (CCTV, alarm reporting) can be expensive because of distances UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Vulnerable Points − Rail Stations and Railways − Open to public access − Busy/Crowded − Small explosive device can have big impact − Difficult to monitor for terrorist activity − Difficult to screen passengers − Can have economic impact with loss of public confidence UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Vulnerable Points − Roadways, Bridges and Tunnels − Open to public access − Traffic gridlock can present an inviting target − Maintenance points give access to critical areas − Vehicle borne explosives are difficult to detect UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Best Practices − Rail Stations − Work with police and emergency response staff to design around security concept of operations − Use pedestrian modeling to eliminate choke points in passenger flow − Use CCTV to monitor interior and exterior − Use intrusion alarm on all entries to non-public spaces − Place police or emergency response assets and accommodations at key points UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Best Practices − Roadways, Bridges and Tunnels − Work with police and emergency response staff to design around security concept of operations − Use CCTV to monitor traffic flows and unusual behavior − Use intrusion alarm on all entries to non-public spaces − Incorporate automatic toll collection equipment into the security system − Use lighting to deter criminal activity UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Best Practices − Use technology − Share technology − Collect data and share information UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Best Practices − Communications is Imperative − Information is critical − Communication of alarms, unusual events or suspicious activity must be instant − Communications in the management of event response saves lives and minimizes damage − Communication Systems must be part of any design UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Best Practices − Communications is a Vulnerability − Information must be kept close − Design drawings are a terrorists best asset − Safeguarding security designs may require different procurement methods in the public sector − Procedures for handling security sensitive information before, during and after design and construction are a must UNECE: Transport Security in the Pan-European Context Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security − Sharing best practice − Promoting international cooperation R&D, technology, detecting and monitoring − Encourage government cooperation with stakeholders − Encourage creation of international working group − Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, UK, USA.
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Score: 1055856.2 - https://unece.org/DAM/trans/doc/2006/itc/itcrt_sec/pres2.pdf
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