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TRANSLATE 6 The Game between Firms and Regulators Reaction of Firms to Policy Change Lucas Critique: • prediction based on historical data (in this case firm behavior) would be invalid • some policy change alters the relationship between relevant variables (such as firms’ rational expectation of competitive forces). The Game between Firms and Regulators Reaction of Firms to Policy Change • Firms will act according to their reaction function that will allow them to maximize their profits. • the policy maker must anticipate the reaction of the firms before making a policy change. • firms will attempt to skirt the intent of the policy if no deterrence of gaming is provided with the new policy. Intersection of Network Externalities and Game Theory The intersection of network externalities and game theory can have significant implications for the regulators in their policy decisions. • Anticipate and analyze the behaviors of firms • Gaming with respect to network externalities affect firms’ decisions to invest or not invest • If a firm can benefit free from an investment of another company, it has incentive to freeload TRANSLATE, QUESTIONS?
Language:English
Score: 1243674 - https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg...20Practices%20-%20Part%201.pdf
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Application in Telecom There may be gaming among firms and the regulator and firms. The Game between Firms: In a simplified scenario for my exposition, I will consider two wireless firms in a market. (...) The regulators would be well served to anticipate and analyze the behaviors of firms as firms internalize the externalities in their gaming behavior. Gaming with respect to network externalities among firms can entail firms’ decisions to invest or not invest.
Language:English
Score: 1195106.9 - https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg...20Theory%20and%20Practices.pdf
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Two crucial features of the model are the presence of network externalities and (endogenously determined) partial incompatibility between the technology of the domestic incumbent and that introduced by the foreign firm. (...) Thus, the foreign firm’s entry affects the degree of competition in the host country market and the extent of the network externality enjoyed by the domestic users. (...) By making the networks based on the two rival technologies better substitutes, greater compatibility can also lead to more intense competition between the firms. See Economides (1991) on the effects of firms’ horizontal compatibility choices in a closed economy with network externalities. 11 If the unit costs of the foreign and domestic products were the same, the foreign firm would have higher sales than the domestic firm since its product is technically superior (recall that 0~ >−= HF aaa ).
Language:English
Score: 1164814.6 - https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg...%20Network%20Externalities.pdf
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Framing the discussion: Value to governments No-agreement benchmark is unilateral behavior (Nash) Focus on trade agreements over tariffs on goods (market access) Primary emphasis on conceptual foundations Two main theoretical approaches: International externalities (Prisoners’Dilemma) Commitment Kyle Bagwell Stanford () Economic Research and the Rationale for Trade AgreementsDecember 10, 2018 2 / 7 GATT objectives and approach GATT objectives as recorded in the GATT Preamble “...Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods...” (...) Kyle Bagwell Stanford () Economic Research and the Rationale for Trade AgreementsDecember 10, 2018 3 / 7 Theoretical Approaches International Externality Terms-of-Trade Theory Profit-Shifting Theory Firm Delocation Theory Trade Policy Uncertainty Theory Offshoring Theory Commitment Theory Kyle Bagwell Stanford () Economic Research and the Rationale for Trade AgreementsDecember 10, 2018 4 / 7 Problem for a trade agreement to solve E E τ * τ W * W WN N W N* Theoretical Approaches International Externality Terms-of-Trade Theory Profit-Shifting Theory Firm Delocation Theory Trade Policy Uncertainty Theory Offshoring Theory Commitment Theory Kyle Bagwell Stanford () Economic Research and the Rationale for Trade AgreementsDecember 10, 2018 6 / 7 Summary Mutual gains from a trade agreement exist when a problem arises under unilateral policy setting, due to International externalities (terms of trade, profit shifting, firm delocation, trade policy uncertainty, bilateral bargaining) Commitment (time-consistency) problems.
Language:English
Score: 1114570.5 - https://www.wto.org/english/re...er_e/session1_kyle_bagwell.pdf
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While these loans provide an important source of financing for firms undergoing temporary economic and financial difficulties, they can also keep poorly managed and low-productivity firms in the market. (...) The prevalence of so-called “zombie firms”—firms with persistent problems in meeting their interest payments obligations—has continuously increased in developed countries in recent years.5 While it is difficult to estab- lish a direct connection between leveraged loans and productivity growth, recent evidence shows that reduced financial pressure and lower interest rates are associated with a higher prevalence of such firms. (...) Developing economies Africa: Surge in African sovereign external bond issuance raises concern Active external bond issuances by Governments in Africa are projected to continue.
Language:English
Score: 1106148.8 - https://www.un.org/development.../45/publication/wesp_mb124.pdf
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In a recent paper, ( 9 ) we examine this issue in the case of both Customs Union (CU) (where there is a common external tariff) and Free Trade Area (FTA) (where member countries set their own external tariffs). (...) Cross-border lobbying, for given levels of domestic lobbying, increases the optimal value of the common external tariff.  In turn, this increases the marginal profits of domestic firms, and thus the marginal benefits of domestic lobbying, resulting in higher equilibrium levels of the latter. (...) Quite detailed data in the U.S.A on lobbying firms, amount spent, and their clients can be found at www.opensecret.org . back to text 7.
Language:English
Score: 1104920.3 - https://www.wto.org/english/re...r11_forum_e/wtr11_3may11_e.htm
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In a recent paper, ( 9 ) we examine this issue in the case of both Customs Union (CU) (where there is a common external tariff) and Free Trade Area (FTA) (where member countries set their own external tariffs). (...) Cross-border lobbying, for given levels of domestic lobbying, increases the optimal value of the common external tariff.  In turn, this increases the marginal profits of domestic firms, and thus the marginal benefits of domestic lobbying, resulting in higher equilibrium levels of the latter. (...) Quite detailed data in the U.S.A on lobbying firms, amount spent, and their clients can be found at www.opensecret.org . back to text 7.
Language:English
Score: 1101548 - https://www.wto.org/french/res...r11_forum_f/wtr11_3may11_f.htm
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. • However, their participation in international trade remains limited relative to larger firms: • This suggests that their ability to benefit from globalisation might also be limited relative to larger firms. (...) Aim Access to scale and low productivity Lack of experience Adoption of technology To-the-border At-the-border Beyond-the- border a) Trade related internal challenges b) Trade related external challenges Internal and external challenges for SMEs in getting goods to markets Note: The figure is for illustrative purposes and non-exhaustive; many other challenges arise whether internal or external. (...) (forthcoming) analysis based on splitting TiVA database using firm level data 5% 7% 12% 5% 3% 67% 13% 10% 4% 26% 18% 53% 21% 8% 15% 3% 6% 4% 1% 18% 41% 6% 22% 1% 86% 64% 63% 31% 11% 10% 28% 26% 23% 68% 23% 25% 20% 32% 29% 53% 33% 27% 28% 17% 24% 21% 7% 27% 46% 13% 30% 11% 87% 77% 64% 29% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Direct Direct + Indirect SMEs export 3- 7 times more indirectly than directly Direct and Indirect exports of SMEs in Viet Nam (2012) 9 Trade and Agriculture Directorate | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) | www.oecd.org/tad | tad.contact@oecd.org • More efficient customs procedures help large and small firms integrate into GVCs, but they also help SMEs more And helping smaller firms become more integrated in GVCs Source: López-Gonzalez et al.
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Score: 1100619.7 - https://www.wto.org/english/tr..._facilitation_presentation.pdf
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Markets can fail and generate too little innovation because new ideas, new products or new technologies in a particular sector can be used by firms in that sector to create other ideas or can be used by firms in other sectors (that is, there are externalities of innovation), but with the innovator not basing decisions to invest in research on economy- wide benefits. (...) Finally, governments may need to intervene to prevent innovators from gaining excessive power and creating obstacles to the entry of new firms into the market (this is the case of network externalities and winner- takes-all dynamics). (...) Such failures occur when a group of firms could achieve a more desirable economic equilibrium but fails to do so because the firms do not coordinate their decision-making.
Language:English
Score: 1099246.5 - https://www.wto.org/english/re...booksp_e/wtr20_e/wtr20-3_e.pdf
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In the latter two cases, FDI firms may still have a favourable impact on economic growth, but there is a risk that an enclave-type economy may emerge marked by large gaps in performance between foreign and domestic firms. (...) I Foreign Direct Investment and intra-industry spillovers (David Greenaway and Holger Gorg, University of Nottingham) Session I will focus on intra-industry (horizontal) spillovers, i.e. the impact on local firms (e.g. productivity changes) due to the presence of foreign firms. (...) Its resources (similar to the EIB and IFC) and the capacity to mobilise other funds are particularly important where local firms have difficulties in obtaining private finance.
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Score: 1094433.2 - https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ead/ffd.htm
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