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REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS (PART 2) :MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 1ST MEETING, GENEVA, 10-14 NOVEMBER 2003 ; MEETING OF EXPERTS, GENEVA, 18-29 AUGUST 2003

The Conference urged all State Parties to refrain from supplying or transferring any biological agents, toxins, equipment, materials and technologies to non-signatories. (...) India The Conference affirms the determination of States Parties to further strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent non-state actors from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining and using under any circumstances, biological agents and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of biological agents or toxins, for non-peaceful purposes. (...) The Conference reaffirms the relevant mechanism established by Article VI of the Convention and notes that the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. Cuba The Conference decides to initiate discussions during the next intersessional period on the developing and establishment of a mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological weapons and toxins Russian Federation The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

The Conference recalls that use, in any way and under any circumstances, of such agents or toxins that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is a violation of the Convention. The Conference condemns any use of biological agents or toxins as weapons in war, armed conflict, or for hostile purposes, including as tools of terrorism. (...) The Conference considers the development and use of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes under any pretext and in any form as a violation of Article I of the Convention.

Recent advances in science and technology have provided a range of new capabilities in this arena, including: different approaches, such as through native air sampling techniques;23 research into in-building early warning and response systems;24 partial prediction systems for normal disease events based on satellite data;25 the identification of pre-clinical disease indicators, such as the expression of switch-like genes;26 the use of engineered bacteria that glow when in the presence of a biological stressor, such as a pathogen;27the use of membrane immunofiltration analysis with visual sensors for tracking of pathogens and toxins;28 as well as improvements in environmental detection of agents by nanowire sensors or by immunographic methods.29 II. (...) There have also been advances in rapid diagnostic capabilities, which would also enable a faster, more efficient and tailored response, including through: new approaches to differentiate between bacterial and viral infections;33the use of real-time reverse transcription PCR to genotype pathogens and identify reassortment events;34 the use of Surface Enhanced Ramen Spectroscopy (SERS) to measure the change in frequency of a near-infrared laser as it scatters off viral DNA or RNA allowing the identification of single particles of pathogens or toxins;35 the real-time diagnosis of fungal pathogens through Selected Ion Flow Tube-Mass Spectrometry (SIFT-MS);36 as well as the use of sequencing capacity as a public health tool to identify causative agents as well as viral subtypes and reassortment events.37 There have also been advances in developing faster assays for toxins, such as for the Clostridium botulinum Neurotoxin Type A.38 III. (...) There have also been relevant advances in developing therapies to deal with toxins, including: the identification of genetic sequences in hosts required for intoxication by ricin and Pseudomonas exotoxin (offering treatment opportunities by blocking the functionality of these genes);61 nanocarriers designed to allow toxins to be flushed from the system;62 nanoparticles designed to trap toxins and carry them to the liver for destruction;63 compounds designed to prevent the uptake of toxins into certain cell types, such as botulinum toxin into nerve cells;64 as well as small binding agents designed to latch on to toxins enabling them to be identified by antibodies, also allowing it to be flushed from the system.65 11.

Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: 3. - Part 1: Background information on outbreaks of reportable infectious diseases; 4. - Part 2: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences that seem to deviate from the normal pattern. 5. (...) Form 3: Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: Part 1: Background information on reportable infectious diseases. Form 4: Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: Part 2: Outbreaks of infectious disease and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

“Offence on illegally producing, stockpiling, transport, using, trading in in- flammables, toxins 1. Those who illegally produce, stockpile, transport, use, trade in and/or trade in inflammables and/or toxins shall be sentenced to between one and five years of im- prisonment. 2. (...) Article 239: “Offence on Breaching regulations relating to the management of inflam- mables, toxins 1. Those who violate the regulations relating to the management of the produc- tion, supply, use, preservation, storage, transport or trading of inflammables and/or tox- ins, causing the loss of lives or serious damage to the health and/or property of other persons shall be sentenced to between one and five years of imprisonment. 2.

S 4/8 AM Cuba Developed countries should promote international cooperation for the benefit of developing countries and eliminate restrictions on the free exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Avoiding obstacles that hinder economic and technological development is an obligation of States Parties. (...) S 5/8 PM United Kingdom … there is no such thing as a one-off state of ‘full implementation’ – progress and assistance are subject to a continuing process given the nature of scientific and technological development and the evolving nature of the threat posed by pathogens and toxins. S 5/8 PM United Kingdom We continue to see no need for any sort of Article X implementation mechanism as characterised in the various more or less identical Working Papers and statements that we have been seeing from some States Parties since 2006. (...) Briefly, some of the tasks identified in that Working Paper are as follows: (i) Identify and address the needs in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of the bacteriological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes; (ii) Identify and overcome the obstacles hampering the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention, including by addressing the denial cases of States Parties; (iii) Mobilize the necessary resources, including financial resources, to facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information regarding the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes, in particular from developed to developing States Parties; (iv) Facilitate the development of human resources in developing States Parties in the implementation of the Convention, taking into account the special situation faced by them; (v) Coordinate cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations for financial and technological support of activities for the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes.

In this regard, developed countries need to eliminate once and for all restrictions to the free exchange of equipment, material and scientific information and technology destined for the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins. S 10/8 AM Cuba We express concern at the attempt by some countries aimed at conditioning the international cooperation through the creation and promotion of arbitrary mechanisms export control and transfers. (...) S 10/8 AM Bangladesh […] call for effective implementation of Article X of the BWC through enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchanges in toxins, biological agents equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. (...) We need to focus on regions and sub-regions through the establishments of Centres of Excellence, with high security laboratories and facilities to train, monitor, manage and eradicate any potential exposure of toxins. BWC States Parties need to agree on regional implementation plans across the world with consent and involvement of States concerned.

With the aim of promoting BTWC awareness and compliance in Canada, the objectives of this course are to develop a foundation of the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity in the trainee such that increased awareness in regards to the ethical, legal and social relevance of dual-use biosecurity, as well as the responsible conduct of research can provide a foundation for the development of policies and procedures to enhance responsibility and prevent the malicious or misuse of pathogens and toxins. 11. This course will also assist in compliance promotion, and therefore, compliance with those undertaking activities with human pathogens and toxins, within the sphere of oversight of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), one of Canada's primary tools in BTWC compliance.

With the aim of promoting BTWC awareness and compliance in Canada, the objectives of this course are to develop a foundation of the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity in the trainee such that increased awareness in regards to the ethical, legal and social relevance of dual-use biosecurity, as well as the responsible conduct of research can provide a foundation for the development of policies and procedures to enhance responsibility and prevent the malicious or misuse of pathogens and toxins. 11. This course will also assist in compliance promotion, and therefore, compliance with those undertaking activities with human pathogens and toxins, within the sphere of oversight of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), one of Canada's primary tools in BTWC compliance.