Home

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS (PART 1) :MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 1ST MEETING, GENEVA, 10-14 NOVEMBER 2003 ; MEETING OF EXPERTS, GENEVA, 18-29 AUGUST 2003

The Conference urged all State Parties to refrain from supplying or transferring any biological agents, toxins, equipment, materials and technologies to non-signatories. (...) India The Conference affirms the determination of States Parties to further strengthen na- tional measures, as appropriate, to prevent non-state actors from developing, produc- ing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining and using under any circum- stances, biological agents and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of biological agents or toxins, for non-peaceful purposes. (...) The Conference reaffirms the relevant mechanism established by Article VI of the Convention and notes that the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. BWC/CONF.VII/5 14 GE.11-65262 Cuba The Conference decides to initiate discussions during the next intersessional period on the developing and establishment of a mechanism for investigating cases of al- leged use of biological weapons and toxins.

(c) Floor area occupied by the research unit (sqM) including: buildings (sqM) laboratories (sqM) production facilities (sqM) sites (sqM) (d) Name biological agents and toxins that the research unit conducts work with including locally endemic agents and toxins (e) Does the research unit have access at its host facility to areas with biological containment? (...) (i) Briefly describe the work conducted by the research unit in the field of biological defence or in the field of infectious disease prevention and control including type(s) of biological agents/or toxins studied, as well as outdoor studies of biological aerosols: (j) Provide information on testing of biological and pharmaceutical preparations on volunteers conducted by the research unit: (i) Is there a testing on the local population of the following: Means of prophylaxis …………………..Yes/No Therapeutics …………………………… Yes/No (k) Does the research unit produce: Vaccines………………………………..Yes/No Human pathogens………………………Yes/No Animal pathogens………………………Yes/No Plant pathogens ………………………...Yes/No (l) Does the research unit collect in the State of its deployment endemic causatives agents of dangerous infectious diseases or toxins………………………………………….Yes/No (m) Provide information on the participation of the personnel of the research unit in investigating and controlling outbreaks of infectious disease. (...) Yes/No (q) Does the research unit: (i) Transfer biological material containing agents and toxins from the State of their origin to other States ………………………………………………….

BACKGROUND PAPER ON NEW SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION / PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

The Conference recalls that use, in any way and under any circumstances, of such agents or toxins that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is a violation of the Convention. The Conference condemns any use of biological agents or toxins as weapons in war, armed conflict, or for hostile purposes, including as tools of terrorism. (...) The Conference considers the development and use of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes under any pretext and in any form as a violation of Article I of the Convention. 27.

Recent advances in science and technology have provided a range of new capabilities in this arena, including: different approaches, such as through native air sampling techniques;23 research into in-building early warning and response systems;24 partial prediction systems for normal disease events based on satellite data;25 the identification of pre-clinical disease indicators, such as the expression of switch-like genes;26 the use of engineered bacteria that glow when in the presence of a biological stressor, such as a pathogen;27the use of membrane immunofiltration analysis with visual sensors for tracking of pathogens and toxins;28 as well as improvements in environmental detection of agents by nanowire sensors or by immunographic methods.29 II. (...) There have also been advances in rapid diagnostic capabilities, which would also enable a faster, more efficient and tailored response, including through: new approaches to differentiate between bacterial and viral infections;33the use of real-time reverse transcription PCR to genotype pathogens and identify reassortment events;34 the use of Surface Enhanced Ramen Spectroscopy (SERS) to measure the change in frequency of a near-infrared laser as it scatters off viral DNA or RNA allowing the identification of single particles of pathogens or toxins;35 the real-time diagnosis of fungal pathogens through Selected Ion Flow Tube-Mass Spectrometry (SIFT-MS);36 as well as the use of sequencing capacity as a public health tool to identify causative agents as well as viral subtypes and reassortment events.37 There have also been advances in developing faster assays for toxins, such as for the Clostridium botulinum Neurotoxin Type A.38 III. (...) There have also been relevant advances in developing therapies to deal with toxins, including: the identification of genetic sequences in hosts required for intoxication by ricin and Pseudomonas exotoxin (offering treatment opportunities by blocking the functionality of these genes);61 nanocarriers designed to allow toxins to be flushed from the system;62 nanoparticles designed to trap toxins and carry them to the liver for destruction;63 compounds designed to prevent the uptake of toxins into certain cell types, such as botulinum toxin into nerve cells;64 as well as small binding agents designed to latch on to toxins enabling them to be identified by antibodies, also allowing it to be flushed from the system.65 11.

Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: 3. - Part 1: Background information on outbreaks of reportable infectious diseases; 4. - Part 2: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences that seem to deviate from the normal pattern. 5. (...) Form 3: Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: Part 1: Background information on reportable infectious diseases. Form 4: Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: Part 2: Outbreaks of infectious disease and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

“Offence on illegally producing, stockpiling, transport, us- ing, trading in inflammables, toxins 1. Those who illegally produce, stockpile, transport, use, trade in and/or trade in inflammables and/or toxins shall be sentenced to between one and five years of imprisonment. 2. (...) Article 239: “Offence on Breaching regulations relating to the manage- ment of inflammables, toxins 1. Those who violate the regulations relating to the management of the production, supply, use, preservation, storage, transport or trading of inflam- mables and/or toxins, causing the loss of lives or serious damage to the health and/or property of other persons shall be sentenced to between one and five years of imprisonment. 7 S/AC.44/2004/(02)/39/Add.1 2.

S 4/8 AM Cuba Developed countries should promote international cooperation for the benefit of developing countries and eliminate restric- tions on the free exchange of equipment, materials and scien- tific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Avoiding obstacles that hinder economic and technological development is an obligation of States Parties. (...) S 5/8 PM United Kingdom … there is no such thing as a one-off state of ‘full implemen- tation’ – progress and assistance are subject to a continuing process given the nature of scientific and technological devel- opment and the evolving nature of the threat posed by patho- gens and toxins. S 5/8 PM United Kingdom We continue to see no need for any sort of Article X imple- mentation mechanism as characterised in the various more or less identical Working Papers and statements that we have been seeing from some States Parties since 2006. (...) Briefly, some of the tasks identified in that Working Paper are as follows: (i) Identify and address the needs in terms of equipment, ma- terials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of the bacteriological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes; (ii) Identify and overcome the obstacles hampering the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention, including by addressing the denial cases of States Parties; (iii) Mobilize the necessary resources, including financial resources, to facilitate the widest possible exchange of equip- ment, material, and scientific and technological information regarding the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes, in particular from developed to developing States Parties; (iv) Facilitate the development of human resources in devel- oping States Parties in the implementation of the Convention, taking into account the special situation faced by them; (v) Coordinate cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations for financial and technological support of activities for the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes.

With the aim of promoting BTWC awareness and compliance in Canada, the objectives of this course are to develop a foundation of the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity in the trainee such that increased awareness in regards to the ethical, legal and social relevance of dual-use biosecurity, as well as the responsible conduct of research can provide a foundation for the development of policies and procedures to enhance responsibility and prevent the malicious or misuse of pathogens and toxins. 11. This course will also assist in compliance promotion, and therefore, compliance with those undertaking activities with human pathogens and toxins, within the sphere of oversight of the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act (HPTA), one of Canada's primary tools in BTWC compliance. (...) Since 2003 the UK has held five Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention-related seminars for academics, research councils, professional and trade organisations, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. (...) The University’s Education Module Resource (EMR) offers content that includes history and national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, dual-use issues in the contemporary life sciences, and responsible conduct in scientific research.