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REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS (PART 1) :MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 1ST MEETING, GENEVA, 10-14 NOVEMBER 2003 ; MEETING OF EXPERTS, GENEVA, 18-29 AUGUST 2003

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS (PART 2) :MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 1ST MEETING, GENEVA, 10-14 NOVEMBER 2003 ; MEETING OF EXPERTS, GENEVA, 18-29 AUGUST 2003

BACKGROUND PAPER ON NEW SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION / PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

BWC/CONF.VII/5 GE.11-65263 5 The Conference urged all State Parties to refrain from supplying or transferring any biological agents, toxins, equipment, materials and technologies to non-signatories. (...) India The Conference affirms the determination of States Parties to further strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent non-state actors from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining and using under any circumstances, biological agents and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of biological agents or toxins, for non-peaceful purposes. (...) The Conference reaffirms the relevant mechanism established by Article VI of the Convention and notes that the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. Cuba The Conference decides to initiate discussions during the next intersessional period on the developing and establishment of a mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological weapons and toxins Russian Federation The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

También se ha avanzado en el desarrollo de ensayos para toxinas más rápidos14. III. Prevención y profilaxis 3. (...) Asimismo, se ha avanzado en la lucha contra las toxinas, incluidas la manipulación genética de los mecanismos del huésped, nanopartículas para atrapar toxinas y la utilización de anticuerpos para que estas sean expulsadas del organismo. (...) There have also been relevant advances in developing therapies to deal with toxins, including: the identification of genetic sequences in hosts required for intoxication by ricin and Pseudomonas exotoxin (offering treatment opportunities by blocking the functionality of these genes);61 nanocarriers designed to allow toxins to be flushed from the system;62 nanoparticles designed to trap toxins and carry them to the liver for destruction;63 compounds designed to prevent the uptake of toxins into certain cell types, such as botulinum toxin into nerve cells;64 as well as small binding agents designed to latch on to toxins enabling them to be identified by antibodies, also allowing it to be flushed from the system.65 11.

The Conference recalls that use, in any way and under any circumstances, of such agents or toxins that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is a violation of the Convention. The Conference condemns any use of biological agents or toxins as weapons in war, armed conflict, or for hostile purposes, including as tools of terrorism. (...) The Conference considers the development and use of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes under any pretext and in any form as a violation of Article I of the Convention. 27.

Rickettsia prowazekii Toxins as follow and subunits thereof:[3] 1. Botulinum toxins[4] 2. (...) Shiga toxin 7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins 8. Tetrodotoxin 9. (...) HT-2 toxin 17. Modeccin toxin 18. Volkensin toxin 19.

Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin producing types2 B 15. Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype 0157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes Toxins as follow and subunits thereof:3 T1. (...) Shiga toxin T7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins S/2006/816 15 06-57427 T8. (...) Aflatoxins T12. Abrin T13. Cholera toxin T14, Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin T15. T-2 toxin T16. 11T-2 toxin T17.

Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: 3. - Part 1: Background information on outbreaks of reportable infectious diseases; 4. - Part 2: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences that seem to deviate from the normal pattern. 5. (...) Form 3: Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: Part 1: Background information on reportable infectious diseases. Form 4: Confidence-building measure B: Outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins: Part 2: Outbreaks of infectious disease and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

Incautar agentes biológicos, toxinas o equipos especificados en el artículo I? (...) Incluyan una lista de agentes biológicos toxinas controlados y armas, equipos, sistemas vectores y/o tecnología relacionados? (...) Capacitación del personal respecto de la manipulación y seguridad adecuada de los agentes y toxinas controlados? (sí/no) No 4.1.6. Regulen las transferencias internas de agentes y toxinas controladas, incluso (sí/no): Si