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Activities of the secretariat to facilitate the preparation of national communications and information on those communications FCCC/SBI/2004/INF.3 National communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. (...) Report on the second meeting of the �onsultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention FCCC/SBI/2004/INF.6 National communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. (...) FCCC/SBI/2004/1 page 18 Report on the workshop on the preparation of second national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention FCCC/SBI/2004/INF.7 National communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention: status report on the review of third national communications.

Recommendations for the national level ..................................... 68 21 B. (...) Additional benchmarks included designating a national institutional focal point on IDPs, and establishing a role for national human rights institutions on the issue. (...) NHRIs could advise on mainstreaming IDP issues into national laws, and developing specific national policies on internal displacement.

���� ���� ������� BWC/MSP.2003/MX/Misc.1 ������� ���� ����� ��������� ���� ���������� �� �������"� ����������� �������� ��� �� ����������� ��������� � � �� �������"���� BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.1 Russian Federation - Proposals on the Draft Questionnaire on National Legislation Ensuring Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 8 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.2 U.S. Strategy for Achieving Meaningful Progress Through Annual Meetings of BWC States Parties, 2003-2005 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.3 United States – National Implementation Measures 2003 BWC Experts Group BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.4 National Measures Adopted by the United States to Implement the Prohibitions Set Forth in the Biological Weapons Convention BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.5 United States – Security of Dangerous Pathogens and Toxins BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.6 Relevant Measures Taken by the United States Relevant to Security and Oversight of Dangerous Pathogens and Toxins BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.7/Rev.1 United Kingdom – The Design of National Mechanisms to Maintain the Security and Oversight of Pathogenic Microorganisms and Toxins BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.8 United Kingdom – BTWC Implementing and Penal Legislation: Core Elements BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.9 A Compiled List of the Laws and Regulations in China in Relation to the Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.10 National Paper prepared by Japan BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.11/Rev.1 Japan – Possible Measures for Strengthening Biosecurity BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.12 Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 9 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.13 Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany Related to Security and Oversight of Pathogenic Microorganisms and Toxins BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.14 The Netherlands - Preventing unauthorized acquisition of pathogenic agents and toxins: A legal patchwork BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.15 Sweden - Possible Measures for Ensuring Security and Oversight of Work with Microorganisms BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.16 Republic of Korea: National Measures or Legislation to Implement the BTWC: A Conceptual Analysis BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.17 France – Biotechnology, Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism – Notes from a Paris Seminar of 9 April 2003 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.18 France – National Mechanisms to Establish and Maintain Surveillance of Microorganism and Toxins, and Prospects for International Cooperation BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.19 France - Biological Risk and Pathogen Control: Lessons from the Study of Emerging Diseases BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.20 Brazilian Views on the Way Forward BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.21 German Experience with the Catch-All Clause BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.22 German Approaches to Awareness-Raising BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.23 Argentina – National Measures to Implement the Biological Weapons Convention BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.24 German Legislation in the Field of Biological Weapons and Agents BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 10 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.25 China – National Implementation measures and Biosecurity and Oversight Mechanisms: Practice and Proposals BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.26 Canada – Meeting Bio-Security Challenges: Development of a Canadian Federal Interdepartmental Collaborative Model BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.27 Canadian Measures to Enhance Domestic Laboratory Security for Biological Agents BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.28 Canada’s Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee: Transparency Model BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.29 The Canadian Counter-Terrorism Technical Center (CTTC) as a Mechanism to Provide Security and Oversight Through Facilities and Equipment BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.30 South Africa: BTWC and Related Legislation BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.31 Domestic Legislation for the BTWC Implementation in the Russian Federation BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.32 National measures on export control adopted by the Russia Federation for implementation of international obligations under the BWC BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.33 Poland – NATO Advanced Research Workshop: “Preparedness against bioterrorism and re- emerging infectious diseases – regional capabilities, needs and expectations in Central and Eastern European countries”, held on 15-18 January 2003 in Warsaw, Poland BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.34 United Kingdom – Managing the Threat from Biological Weapons: Science, Society and Secrecy BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 11 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.35 Germany – Coherent National Implementation as a Means to Improve the Effectiveness of the BTWC BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.36 Germany - Measures Relevant to the Security and Oversight of Biological Materials BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.37 German Genetic Engineering Legislation Related to Contained Use BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.38 Australia’s Experience in Educating Industry and Research Institutes about Export Obligations – A Framework for the Biological Sector BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.39 Australia – Model Strategy for Implementing BWC Obligations BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.40 National Measures in Ukraine to Control Genetic Modification BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.41 General Information on Sanitary- Epidemiological Surveillance System in Ukraine and Measures Taken to Counteract Possible Bioterrorist Activity in the Context of Events of Autumn 2001 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.42 Procedure to Control Access and Work with Biological Agents and Toxins in Ukraine BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.43 Ukraine – Information on Criminal Responsibility for the Bioterrorist Activity and Activity Aimed at Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.44 Poland’s Legislation Relating to BTWC BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 12 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.45 United Kingdom – Practical Implementation and Enforcement: National Infrastructure BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.46 Cuba - Mecanismos Nacionales Para [������ � ��. �"���*] Establecery Mantener La Seguridad y La Vigilancia de Microorganismos Pathógenos y Toxinas BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.47 Cuba - Adopción de Medidas Nacionales �������� �� �����"���*] Necesarias Para Aplicar Las Prohibiciones Establecidas en la Convención Incluida la Promulgatión de una Legislatión Penal BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.48 Meeting BWC Obligations: Australia’s Experience with Licensing, Accreditation and Authorization of Work with Genetically Modified Organisms BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.49 Meeting BWC Obligations: Australia’s Experience with Facility Planning and Management for Dealing with Genetically Modified Organisms BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.50 Meeting BWC Obligations: Australian Experience with a National Model for Regulating Laboratory Work with Genetically Modified Organisms BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.51 Islamic Republic of Iran – National Implementation Measures BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.52 Malaysia – Legislative Action to Implement the Obligations under the BWC BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.53 Austria – Cooperation with Foreign Missions in Austria: Case Study “Anthrax” * ���������� ����� � ������� �� ! ��� ����������� ��� �� ��� ���"���� BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 13 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.54 Islamic Republic of Iran – National Report on national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.55 Regulations and guidelines in the Islamic Republic of Iran on national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.56 Practical aspects of export licensing: Australia’s experience BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.57 Finland’s New Penal Legislation on Biological Weapons and Terrorism BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.58 National legislative and regulatory provisions for the implementation by the Republic of Bulgaria of the prohibitions set forth in the BWC BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.59 Germany – International Regulations for the Safe Transport of Biological Materials BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.60 Mexico – Medidas relatives a la aplicación [������ � ��. �"���] sobre la Prohibición de las Armas Biológicas BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.61 The Biological Weapons Convention in Thailand BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.62 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom – BTWC and Related Legislation BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) page 14 BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.63 United Kingdom – Issues of Licensing, Accreditation and Authorisation: The Example of the Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998 (SAPO) BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.64 United Kingdom – Emergency Preparedness and Response BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.65 United Kingdom – Legislation Governing Intangible Technology BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.66 Export Control Legislation in the United Kingdom __________

Therefore, the National Convention was convened in 1993 to consider basic principles of new State Constitution with the participation of all national races and all political parties including the National League for Democracy (NLD). 3. (...) The NLD was invited to participate in the resumed session of the National Convention. It first agreed to participate, but only two days before the meeting the NLD once again decided not to attend the National Convention. 4. (...) The Government has formed the National Human Rights Body as a preliminary step with a view to establishing the National Human Rights Commission in conformity with the international norms in future.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The term “beyond national jurisdiction” incorporates both the High Seas and the seabed, ocean floor and sub-soil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (...) Uniqueness may be considered in national, regional, and global contexts, with increased importance at each scale. (...) Complementary protection adjacent to areas beyond national jurisdiction and national Ecologically Or Biologically Significant Areas may be nec- essary for conservation measures in either to be effective.

PROCESS CURRENTLY UTILIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO ACCREDIT NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARIS PRINCIPLES : REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

As such, DNPM agrees to this recommendation. 32 Education and access to education, especially the rural areas of PNG, is a priority for the Government. 33 The Government has developed Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Policy, and the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender Based Violence and the National Policy for Women and Gender Equality. (...) Sectorial agencies are aware of their mandated responsibilities and have in place sectorial responses, for example Family Sexual Violence Units at Police Stations and Family Support Centers in the General Hospitals. 78 Refer to notes under 104.118. 79 The Government will ratify on the basis of priority considering the constraints faced in National Institutions and processes at the national level. (...) The planning and monitoring responsibly act ties the national budget to the national plans and provides the legislative basis for service delivery requirements.

The terminology relating to offences on incitement to national, racial or religious hatred varies from country to country and is increasingly vague, while new categories of restrictions or limitations to freedom of expression are being incorporated in national legislation. (...) The Principles represent a progressive interpretation of international law and standards, accepted State practice (as reflected, inter alia, in national laws and the judgments of national courts), and the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations. (...) It is hoped that they will boost both national efforts and international cooperation in this area.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND REPORTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL : INFORMATION / PRESENTED BY THE NETWORK OF AFRICAN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS ON BEHALF OF "A" STATUS NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA ; NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT