Several non-reciprocal preferential schemes are negotiated and agreed upon jointly by the preference-giving and preference-receiving countries. (...) Graduation or the withdrawal of GSP preferences rests on the argument by preference-giving countries that preferences comprise special treatment that should be reserved only for the most needy developing countries. (...) The effective promulgation of these non-reciprocal preferences for LDCs and their implementation would herald an innovation in the system of trade preferences, namely South-South preferences.
Language:English
Score: 742458.94
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tr...e/devel_e/sem01_e/ongugl_e.doc
Data Source: un
First, I think the core of what we are addressing is the issue of preference erosion as it relates to long-standing preference schemes. (...) Scope of Preference Erosion
6. In developing our approach to addressing preference erosion, I believe it is important to realistically scope the issue at hand. (...) Possible Means of Addressing Preference Erosion
7. The question before us then is: how do we address the erosion of long-standing preferences?
Language:English
Score: 741485.4
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tr.../agric_e/ref_paper_prefs_e.doc
Data Source: un
First, I think the core of what we are addressing is the issue of preference erosion as it relates to long-standing preference schemes. (...) Scope of Preference Erosion
6. In developing our approach to addressing preference erosion, I believe it is important to realistically scope the issue at hand. (...) Possible Means of Addressing Preference Erosion
7. The question before us then is: how do we address the erosion of long-standing preferences?
Language:English
Score: 741485.4
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tr.../agric_e/ref_paper_prefs_e.pdf
Data Source: un
It is not an official record of the negotiations.
Trade preferences
See also Phase 1 (developing countries).
Most countries, both developed and developing, say trade preferences are important for poorer countries, and therefore the preferences should not be removed abruptly. (...) A number of developing countries say that the trade preferences cover non-agricultural products as well.
Language:English
Score: 739336.43
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tr..._e/negs_bkgrnd24_ph2pref_e.htm
Data Source: un
It is clear from the ordinary meanings of “non-discriminatory”, however, that preference-granting countries must make available identical tariff preferences to all similarly-situated beneficiaries.
E.1.2.4 EC — Tariff Preferences , para. 155 ( WT/DS246/AB/R )
… Footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) stipulates that, in addition to being “non-discriminatory”, tariff preferences provided under GSP schemes must be “generalized”. (...) An interpretation of “non-discriminatory” that does not require the granting of “identical tariff preferences” allows not only for GSP schemes providing preferential market access to all beneficiaries, but also the possibility of additional preferences for developing countries with particular needs, provided that such additional preferences are not inconsistent with other provisions of the Enabling Clause, including the requirements that such preferences be “generalized” and “non-reciprocal”.
Language:English
Score: 736914.1
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tr...e/dispu_e/repertory_e/e1_e.htm
Data Source: un
These unilateral trade preferences have become known as the Generalized System of Prefer- ences (GSP). (...) They use three different trade preference (TP) measures: (i) tariff margins (tMFN- tTP), (ii) preference ratios (1-tTP/tMFN), and (iii) existence of trade preferences (a dummy variable that takes the value one if a trade preference scheme ex- ists). (...) In particular, they find that enjoying trade preferences boosts DCs’ exports by about 6 % cumulative over the period (impact of the preference dummy), that a 100% elimination of tariffs (the pref- erential tariff becomes 0%) would also increase ex- ports of all products by 6 % on average and that a 1% increase in the tariff margin would increase DCs’ exports by about 0.3%.
Language:English
Score: 736136.23
-
https://www.un.org/development...lication/CDP-review-2016-4.pdf
Data Source: un
However, Preference-granting Members applying another method may continue to use it. (...) If a Preference-granting Member still requires maintaining a combination of two or more criteria for the same product, that Preference-granting Member remains open to consider relaxing such requirements for that specific product upon due request by an LDC.
1.5. Preference-granting Members are encouraged to offer alternative rules for the same product.
Language:English
Score: 736125.83
-
https://www.wto.org/english/th...o_e/minist_e/mc10_e/l917_e.htm
Data Source: un
ANNEX D-4
AGREED CONCLUSIONS
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREFERENCES
I.
The Special Committee on Preferences :
1. (...) The secretariat of UNCTAD should be invited to compile and distribute to Governments of member States an integrated text on rules of origin that will be applied by the preference-giving countries for the purpose of the generalized system of preferences.
(...) These developing countries consider themselves under Conference resolution 21 (II) to be prospective beneficiaries in the generalized system of preferences and therefore entitled to preferential treatment in the markets of all preference-giving countries.
Language:English
Score: 733478.8
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/246r_e_e.doc
Data Source: un
WT/DS246/R Page D-8
ANNEX D-4
AGREED CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREFERENCES
I.
The Special Committee on Preferences:
1. (...) The secretariat of UNCTAD should be invited to compile and distribute to Governments of member States an integrated text on rules of origin that will be applied by the preference-giving countries for the purpose of the generalized system of preferences.
(...) These developing countries consider themselves under Conference resolution 21 (II) to be prospective beneficiaries in the generalized system of preferences and therefore entitled to preferential treatment in the markets of all preference-giving countries.
Language:English
Score: 733478.8
-
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/246r_e_e.pdf
Data Source: un
Although low themselves, the contraceptive use levels in Eastern Africa countries are somewhat higher than they are in Western and Central Africa.
3. Fertility Preferences
Although numerous measures of fertility preference can be found in the literature, we employ one indicator—preference for no more children—to describe the place of preferences in the fertility- contraceptive use-preference nexus. (...) Do male reproductive preferences really point to a need to refocus fertility policy. (...) Ojelade (1987). Family size preferences and fertility in South-Western Nigeria.
Language:English
Score: 733119.63
-
https://www.un.org/en/developm.../events/pdf/expert/3/dodoo.pdf
Data Source: un
