Vision for the Year 2025
Assessment of major parameters of Water Wastewater Sector until 2025
30.030.016.016.08.08.00.50.50.450.45RuralRural
60.060.049.049.040.040.024.024.017.717.7UrbanUrban
10010094.094.088.088.062.062.057.557.5RuralRural
10010010010010010098.098.097.797.7UrbanUrban
Population Population coveragecoverage
(%)(%)
20.520.521.021.021.221.222.722.721.521.5RuralRural
70.070.056.156.150.150.145.245.243.943.9UrbanUrbanPredicted Predicted population population
(in Millions)(in Millions)
20252025201520152009200920052005 20 years20 years10 years10 yearsEndEndBeginBegin
ProjectionProjection44thth PlanPlan Base year Base year
20042004 Time sectionTime section
Parameter titleParameter title
W at
er W
as te
w at
er
Outlook for Water & Wastewater Sector in the next 20 years (2025)
Safe potable water ,for all the people in Safe potable water ,for all the people in the countrythe country Availability of wastewater collection, Availability of wastewater collection, treatment and discharge systems in urban treatment and discharge systems in urban and rural areas and rural areas Treatment and discharge of industrial Treatment and discharge of industrial wastewaters in accordance with national wastewaters in accordance with national standardsstandards Financial self sufficiency and Financial self sufficiency and independence of water and wastewater independence of water and wastewater unitsunits
Outlook for Water & Wastewater Sector in the next 20 years (2025)
Achieving an efficient administrative and Achieving an efficient administrative and managerial structure towards the managerial structure towards the facilitation and improvement of servicesfacilitation and improvement of services Achieving an equilibrium and protecting Achieving an equilibrium and protecting the sanitary potable water resources the sanitary potable water resources Achieving a desirable level of Achieving a desirable level of Unaccounted for water in supply, transfer Unaccounted for water in supply, transfer and distribution systemsand distribution systems Use of advanced technology to achieve Use of advanced technology to achieve proper operations of the water and proper operations of the water and wastewater installationswastewater installations
Outlook for Water & Wastewater Sector in the next 20 years (2025)
Promoting the idea of water as an irreplaceable Promoting the idea of water as an irreplaceable economical commodity and its efficient use economical commodity and its efficient use according to a consumption pattern.according to a consumption pattern.
Language:English
Score: 1399072.1
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https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev...a/presentations/ardakanian.pdf
Data Source: un
System reports, traffic analysis, resource status making it a waste of resource and money [17]. spectral clustering, K-mean clustering, support vector machine and deep neural network are ML techniques that To find the proper state of resource allocation, future requests can be used for this task. (...) Moreover, to determine proper complete slice isolation, making it more complicated to find network parameters, reinforcement learning is usually the equilibrium point.
Language:English
Score: 1309406.1
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https://www.itu.int/en/publica.../files/basic-html/page198.html
Data Source: un
In support of this statement we think it proper to recall that most of the delegations were in agreement, in their speeches at the previous
Plenary Meetings, in stating the common desire that the hope we have referred to should be embraced with generous understanding in the Charter under
discussion.
After two months of work at this Conference - which was originally expected to finish on the 15th of January - there remain undecided questions
of the greatest importance regarding problems on whose equitable solution depends the establishment in the Charter of the desired equilibrium between
the industrialized countries and those others that aspire to the increasing development of their resources in order to realize the guiding principles of economic co-operation contained in the United Nations Charter.
Language:English
Score: 1286331.4
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https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90040087.pdf
Data Source: un
With the methods need to have complete data on the system’s purpose of providing security in the network, deep neural variables; instead, intelligent methods have the ability to network and principal component analysis algorithms are consider all variables and find the equilibrium point where utilized and the goal is to learn the behavior of users and a KPI is met while having the maximum revenue possible [41]. devices in order to detect malicious behavior and intrusion Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) is a perfect candidate for in the network [16]. this problem, considering all variables in the network and learning its behavior to determine the best decision for 5. (...) Deep reinforcement techniques operate as follows: Due to the daily advances of technology and industry, there are still a number of challenges and research topics that need • When a new request arrives, the system takes an action to to be addressed to ensure the proper functioning of the sliced maximize the long-term award. (...) Moreover, since beyond • Taking the proper action against threats and attacks 5G networks have higher data rates and a vast number of new emerged use cases, these challenges become more Artificial intelligence has a worthwhile impact in analyzing severe.
Language:English
Score: 1274808
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https://www.itu.int/en/publica.../files/basic-html/page200.html
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Brian McCaig (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada)
Export markets and household business performance: Evidence from Vietnam (with Nina Pavcnik)
Tuesday, 10 October Petal 2, Room S4
Paola Conconi [Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), CEPR, and CESifo]
Globalization for Sale
Tuesday, 17 October Petal 2, Room S4
Mauro Boffa (International Trade Centre)
SMEs in a world of Global Value Chains
Tuesday, 24 October Petal 2, Room S4
Marius Brulhart (UNIL, University of Lausanne)
Let There Be Light: Trade and the Development of Border Regions
Tuesday, 7 November Petal 2, Room S4
Mostafa Beshkar (Indiana University)
Interdependence of Trade Policies In General Equilibrium
Tuesday, 14 November Petal 2, Room S4
Prof. (...) You can buy a sandwich, or a proper hot meal, at the Maison de la Paix Cafeteria prior to attending the lecture.
3.
Language:English
Score: 1264120.9
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https://www.wto.org/english/re...dw_e/wkshop17_e/autumn17_e.htm
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Changes to product standards also trigger two general-equilibrium effects, both of which ren- der the non-cooperative equilibrium inefficient. (...) I show that standards can affect welfare through two partial-equilibrium effects and two general-equilibrium effects. (...) In the fixed cost case, there are also a partial-equilibrium effect and a general-equilibrium
production relocation effect.
Language:English
Score: 1259134.2
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https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ymeipaper.pdf
Data Source: un
While in both situations governments can be
stuck at an ine¢ cient equilibrium, a key issue of the immigration policy game is equilibrium
selection (an issue that does not emerge in a prisoners dilemma situation, where there is only
one equilibrium). (...) Intuitively, the robust
equilibrium is an equilibrium of this perturbed game when the noise tends to zero. (...) This equilibrium, (r; :::; r), is dened by Wh (r; F ) =Wh r; F
8h and is Pareto-inferior
to the payo¤ dominant equilibrium (̂; :::; ̂).
Language:English
Score: 1250449.2
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https://www.wto.org/english/re...e/gtdw_e/wkshop10_e/ruta_e.pdf
Data Source: un
Page 121 - ITU Journal Future and evolving technologies Volume 2 (2021), Issue 1
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ITU Journal on Future and Evolving Technologies, Volume 2 (2021), Issue 1 4.4 Equilibrium and its uniqueness mated as follows: In this section we ind the equilibrium and establish its ℎ uniqueness. ≈ ℎ − 2 , (33) + ℎ Theorem 2 In the game Γ( , , ), Nash equilibrium , ≤ , 2 ( , ) is unique. (...) Proposition 4 implies that, for negligible background Then, the Nash equilibrium ( , ) can be approximated as noise at the receivers, the equilibrium strategies of the follows: transmitter and the jammer are proportional to ratio / . 1 Note that, in the SLCC problem solved in [14, 15] for ≈ (Ω , 0) = 1 + 1 + 4 Ω , (39) 0 0 negligible background noise at the receiver, equilibrium 2Ω 0 ∈ ℎ strategies are given in closed form. Proposition 4 also supplies the equilibrium strategies in closed form for the ≈ / for ∈ , (40) MLCC problem.
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Score: 1245695.5
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https://www.itu.int/en/publica.../files/basic-html/page121.html
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Page 121 - ITUJournal Future and evolving technologies Volume 2 (2021), Issue 1
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View Full Version
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P. 121
ITU Journal on Future and Evolving Technologies, Volume 2 (2021), Issue 1 4.4 Equilibrium and its uniqueness mated as follows: In this section we ind the equilibrium and establish its ℎ uniqueness. ≈ ℎ − 2 , (33) + ℎ Theorem 2 In the game Γ( , , ), Nash equilibrium , ≤ , 2 ( , ) is unique. (...) Proposition 4 implies that, for negligible background Then, the Nash equilibrium ( , ) can be approximated as noise at the receivers, the equilibrium strategies of the follows: transmitter and the jammer are proportional to ratio / . 1 Note that, in the SLCC problem solved in [14, 15] for ≈ (Ω , 0) = 1 + 1 + 4 Ω , (39) 0 0 negligible background noise at the receiver, equilibrium 2Ω 0 ∈ ℎ strategies are given in closed form. Proposition 4 also supplies the equilibrium strategies in closed form for the ≈ / for ∈ , (40) MLCC problem.
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Score: 1245695.5
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https://www.itu.int/en/publica.../files/basic-html/page121.html
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SOLUTION OF THE GAME In this section we ind equilibrium strategies in closed − form using a constructive approach via inding all solu‑ ℎ ( , ) = , (7) tions of the best response equations. (...) Thus, (13) correspondingly). ( , ) is the payoff to the transmitter, while for the jam‑ Proposition 1 Each equilibrium ( , ) of the game mer ( , ) is the cost function. (...) We look for the Nash equilibrium [2]. Re‑ call that ( , ) is a Nash equilibrium in a zero‑sum game ∗ ∗ = ( , ) if and only if the following inequalities hold: 2 2 ⎧ , ≤ , ( , ) ≤ ( , ) ≤ ( , ) for all ( , ) ∈ × . ⎪ ℎ ℎ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ (9) ⎪ ℎ Let ≜ 1 + 1 + 4 + ⎨ ℎ 2 2 ( , ) = ln( ( , )) ⎪ ℎ , ℎ > ⎪ 2 + ℎ ⎩ = ln − . (10) ℎ + ℎ (14) ∈ ∈ and Since ln(⋅) is an increasing function, the problem to ind the Nash equilibrium with payoff ( , ) to the transmit‑ = ( , ) ter is equivalent to inding the Nash equilibrium with pay‑ off ( , ) to the transmitter, i.e., such ( , ) that ℎ ∗ ∗ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ 1 + 1 + 4 ℎ + ⎥ ( , ) ≤ ( , ) ≤ ( , ) for all ( , ) ∈ × . ⎢ 1 ℎ ⎥ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ (11) ≜ ⎢ − ℎ ⎥ , (15) Denote this game by Γ = Γ( , , ). ⎢ 2 + ⎥ Note that the transmitter’s equilibrium strategy also re‑ ⎣ ⎦ + lects the most fair power resource allocation to main‑ tain communication with all the receiversunder the worst where ∈ and ⌊ ⌋ ≜ max{ , 0}.
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Score: 1231057.6
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https://www.itu.int/en/publica.../files/basic-html/page119.html
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