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For instance, whereas spectrum rights allocated through auctions are generally very precisely defined and specify the type of technology to be used, New Zealand and Australia have developed technology neutral allocation systems which do not specify the exact use to which the frequencies have to be put and which allow the resale of spectrum rights. An important difference between these two countries, however, is that in New Zealand spectrum can be traded by spectrum managers – i.e. operators whose commercial activity is to subdivide the spectrum they acquire through auctions in the manner they consider appropriate and lease it to third party users – whereas this possibility does not exist in Australia. (...) In this country, the communications market may have been too small to support successful resale market, a factor that may explain why such resale did not take place.
Language:English
Score: 1225138.4 - https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg...ents/S3-KostasArgyropoulos.pdf
Data Source: un
The Panel majority went on to explain that, while this comparison would have been useful for the “benefit” analysis, it would have been necessary to explore a number of important questions and factual issues in order to apply it.   Finally, one member of the Panel expressed a dissenting opinion on the European Union's subsidization claims, finding that the European Union had demonstrated that the challenged measures conferred a “benefit” under the terms of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.  (...) In the light of its findings, the Appellate Body did not consider it necessary to address Canada's claim that the Panel failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU in concluding that the Government of Ontario purchases electricity under the FIT Programme “with a view to commercial resale”. As regards the European Union's appeal relating to Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the European Union failed to establish that the challenged measures confer a benefit within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, because the Panel erred in defining the relevant market and in its benefit analysis.
Language:English
Score: 1225135.2 - https://www.wto.org/english/tr..._e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm
Data Source: un
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN THE 1993 SNA / SUBMITTED BY UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIVISION
Fraud often relates to false claims for social benefits or subsidies. The relevant transactions are registered in the system. (...) The ECE/CES/GE.20/2006/9 page 10 same holds for normal rates of theft from stocks of goods for resale. Output and value added of wholesalers and retailers are influenced negatively by theft. 9.16. (...) Fraud often relates to false claims for social benefits or subsidies by giving incorrect information.
Language:English
Score: 1225095.8 - daccess-ods.un.org/acce...DS=ECE/CES/GE.20/2006/9&Lang=E
Data Source: ods
Simplified licensing procedures, such as class licensing, will reduce the hassle and delays associated with obtaining a license to begin operations. 4. Unbundling and Resale In markets where there is insufficient competition, regulators may want to require incumbents to provide unbundling and resale to competing service providers in the short term.
Language:English
Score: 1218318.4 - https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg...04/Contributions/Singapore.pdf
Data Source: un
External issues: the adaptation of criminal organizations to the controls that has affected the positive effect of the measures. The benefits of the system: The system has shown Theft figures with a stable and downward trend in the medium term Other effect are the incentives for legal importation and sale of mobile devices. (...) For this reason, this measure is susceptible to simplification, since a cost-benefit relationship can be mainteined similar to the one we have with the statu quo. 2) What is the balance of the measures implemented against the problem? (...) However, in the long term this effect has been nullified by the adaptation to the controls and it shows a greater speed in the crime value chain (theft, reception, alteration and illegal resale). In conclusion, an IMEI safe against alteration is required to increase the effectiveness of technical measures and improvings in comprehensive measures at the level of law enforcement and customs actions.
Language:English
Score: 1214684.1 - https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/...-2021_counterfeit_colombia.pdf
Data Source: un
External issues: the adaptation of criminal organizations to the controls that has affected the positive effect of the measures. The benefits of the system: The system has shown Theft figures with a stable and downward trend in the medium term Other effect are the incentives for legal importation and sale of mobile devices. (...) For this reason, this measure is susceptible to simplification, since a cost-benefit relationship can be mainteined similar to the one we have with the statu quo. 2) What is the balance of the measures implemented against the problem? (...) However, in the long term this effect has been nullified by the adaptation to the controls and it shows a greater speed in the crime value chain (theft, reception, alteration and illegal resale). In conclusion, an IMEI safe against alteration is required to increase the effectiveness of technical measures and improvings in comprehensive measures at the level of law enforcement and customs actions.
Language:English
Score: 1214684.1 - https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/...-2021_counterfeit_colombia.pdf
Data Source: un
MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION (2010) : CHAPTER 4
As low pricing usually involves benefits to consumers, jurisdictions may be reluctant to condemn pricing as predatory. (...) On the other hand, consumers and small businesses in developing countries may derive more benefits from lower prices, leading to agencies being reluctant to intervene. (...) Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720, 724 (1988). Because maximum resale price maintenance may lead to low prices, the Supreme Court recently ruled that maximum resale price maintenance is not per se an offence.
Language:English
Score: 1214068.7 - daccess-ods.un.org/acce...en&DS=TD/RBP/CONF.7/L.4&Lang=E
Data Source: ods
  U
. · Mexico has failed to permit resale in violation of its Schedule of Specific Commitments. (...) The list in paragraph 1.2 of the Reference Paper is not exhaustive and other practices, such as price fixing and formation of cartels are covered by paragraph 1.2. · The obligation to ensure access to and use of the public telecommunications network under the Annex on Telecommunications applies to foreign suppliers of any basic telecommunications services included in a WTO Member's Schedule of Specific Commitments. · Regulations required to make market access commitments effective should be in place at the time the commitments become effective or soon thereafter and at a minimum, the effort to draft and adopt such rules should be commenced by the time the commitment comes into force. · Use of the phrase "facilities-based" in Mexico's Schedule of Specific Commitments means that Mexico has NOT agreed to permit provision of service through resale. LESSONS FOR REGULATORS · Make sure that all regulations necessary to implement its commitments have been adopted by the time WTO obligations come into force or are in the process of being drafted. · Require that interconnection rates for international and domestic termination charged by the major supplier are based on a costing methodology that only looks at the costs of providing the specific service and does not include costs associated with providing universal service or achieving other social goals. · Make sure that charges for network components do not differ significantly based on whether they are used for domestic or international service. · Allow new competitors to set prices for their services and freely negotiate commercial agreements for international and domestic services. · Adopt measures to prevent a wide variety of anti-competitive conduct on the part of all market participants, including price-fixing, market-sharing arrangements and other cartel practices. · Include a demand substitution test (the degree to which consumers would switch to other services) as part of an analysis of relevant markets. · Adopt measures to ensure that new competitors have "access to and use of" the major supplier's network, including private leased circuits at rates that are not substantially higher than the major supplier charges for domestic interconnection. · Permit resale of domestic and international facilities of the incumbent.
Language:English
Score: 1206969.6 - https://www.wto.org/english/tr...hop_dec04_e/us_mexico_case.doc
Data Source: un
Regulatory initiatives such as local loop unbundling and bitstream access are required to provide wholesale inputs to other operators so as to provide for retail competition thus leading to increased consumer welfare benefits of price, choice and quality. On the supply side it is Version 1.0 2 important to ensure that competition is sustainable. (...) However in order to encourage infrastructure based competition a Regulator may look to allow lower margins for a product which is largely resale, as opposed to a product relying on infrastructure investment. This can be achieved by setting retail minus pricing for products which are predominantly resale versus cost based wholesale pricing for investment projects.
Language:English
Score: 1200735.4 - https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg...SR04/Contributions/Ireland.pdf
Data Source: un
of!17/10/2005:!fiscal!benefits!in!art.!46[49! ! *!Conven>on!on!Establishment! (...) regulate!the!‘tailor[ made’!benefits!and!obliga>ons.! ! *!Conven>on!on!Free!Zones! (...) Madagascar!would!also!like!to!benefit!from!the!use!of!the!soqware!and!the!data!
Language:English
Score: 1200354.1 - https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-...car_CountryPresentation-en.pdf
Data Source: un