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The Prosecutor will take necessary and reasonable steps to ensure the safety and protection of Milan Babic and members of his immediate family. (...) Milan Babic understands that if a trial were held, the Prosecutor would be required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Joint Criminal Enterprise a. A plurality of persons were involved in the commission of the crime of Persecutions; b. (...) Persecutions a. an armed conflict existed during the time frame of the Indictment; b. there was a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population; c. the plan and conduct of the joint criminal enterprise was related to the widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population; d. the Accused had knowledge of the wider context in which the conduct of the joint criminal enterprise occurred; e. members of the joint criminal enterprise committed acts or omissions pursuant to the plan of the joint criminal enterprise against a victim or victim population violating a basic or fundamental human right; f. the conduct of the joint criminal enterprise was committed on political, racial religious grounds; g. the conduct of the joint criminal enterprise was committed with a deliberate intent to discriminate.
Language:English
Score: 972253.3 - https://www.icty.org/x/cases/b...bic/custom4/en/plea_annexA.pdf
Data Source: un
Rahim ADEMI failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts, or to punish the perpetrators thereof. (...) These alleged acts of omissions, constituting Crimes against Humanity, which are crimes punishable under Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal, were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, specifically the civilian population of the Medak Pocket. 12. (...) As a result of these widespread and systematic unlawful acts during the Croatian military operation, the Medak Pocket became totally uninhabitable.
Language:English
Score: 970347 - https://www.icty.org/x/cases/a...i_old/ind/en/ade-ii010608e.htm
Data Source: un
On the basis of the information obtained by the investigation team, there are reasonable grounds to believe the Sri Lankan security forces and paramilitary groups associated with them were implicated in unlawful killings carried out in a widespread manner against civilians and other protected persons. (...) On the basis of the information obtained by the team, there are reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture were committed on a widespread or systematic scale. (...) The information gathered by the investigation team gave reasonable grounds to believe that rape and other forms of sexual violence by security forces personnel was widespread against both male and female detainees, particularly in the aftermath of the armed conflict.
Language:English
Score: 966782.2 - https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de...Documents/A_HRC_30_61_ENG.docx
Data Source: un
The network possessed the means to carry out a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, as its members had access to and utilised a considerable amount of capital, guns, crude weapons and manpower.  William Ruto provided essential contributions to the implementation of the common plan by way of organising and coordinating the commission of widespread and systematic attacks that meet the threshold of crimes against humanity, in the absence of which the plan would have been frustrated. (...) SUMMONSES TO APPEAR On 15 December 2010, the ICC Prosecutor requested Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC to issue summonses to appear for six Kenyans on the basis that there existed reasonable grounds to believe that they were criminally responsible for crimes against humanity. (...) The majority also agreed that there is no reason to re-characterise the charges. PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS 628 victims are participating in proceedings and are represented by Wilfred Nderitu.
Language:English
Score: 965409 - https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/...ormationSheets/RutoSangEng.pdf
Data Source: un
We propose two methods because the more sophisticated one relies on a new addition to the DNS which is not yet widespread; we propose a simpler method which can be used immediately anywhere where DNS is deployed, and can be made forward compatible, so that the second method will automatically be used wherever possible. (...) If it is a FQDN, however, it is reasonable to insist that its IP number is that of the gatekeeper to which the URL refers. (...) Until this support becomes widespread, there is a reasonable chance that the SVR query will fail.
Language:English
Score: 965409 - https://www.itu.int/wftp3/av-a...997-2000/9702_Bos/AVC-1161.doc
Data Source: un
RESOLUTION GSC-16/11: (GTSC) Cybersecurity (Reaffirmed) RESOLUTION GSC-17/22: (IPR WG) Intellectual Property Rights Policies (Reaffirmed) The 17th Global Standards Collaboration meeting (Jeju, 13 – 16 May 2013) Recognizing: a) that effective standardization utilizes intellectual property rights policies that encourage participation, respect the contribution of valuable intellectual property, and result in standards that are technically proficient and widely accepted; b) that such intellectual property rights policies typically provide incentives to interoperate, innovate and compete by: · respecting intellectual property, · balancing the interests of all stakeholders so that the outcomes are representative, inclusive and more broadly supported, · being open and transparent for all to review and understand, · promoting the use of the best technical solutions given commercial requirements, · being consistent with internationally accepted norms such as widely accepted RAND/FRAND-based intellectual property rights policies, · recognizing the right of intellectual property right holders to receive reasonable and adequate compensation for the shared use of their technology; c) that such effective intellectual property rights policies; (i) encourage participation in standardization and the contribution of valuable technology, (ii) stimulate the sharing and adoption of technological advances that otherwise would be outside the relevant IPR policy, (iii) stimulate innovation, both in terms of the interoperability technology and also additional, non-standard features to accommodate customer needs and consumer choice, and (iv) solve interoperability challenges in effective ways that are focused and well-defined while preventing splintering (which can undermine the primary interoperability objective); d) that such effective intellectual property rights policies do not discourage either collaboration or widespread acceptance because they do not (1) mandate corporate patent searches, (2) impose unreasonable disclosure obligations, (3) seek to impose inflexible licensing commitments on intellectual property holders or (4) permit any group discussion of licensing terms during the standards development organization’s meetings or activities; e) that the intellectual property rights policies of the majority of standards development organizations include provisions for standards users to license standards-essential intellectual property under RAND/FRAND compensatory or compensation-free (e.g. royalty free) terms and conditions; f) that there is a trend in some user communities and some standards development organizations in support of patent policies with enforced compensation-free provisions for standards implementers; g) that there are some standards development organizations whose intellectual property rights policies are exclusive to members and discriminatory to non-members; h) that not all intellectual property holders are members/participants of standards development organizations; and i) that some intellectual property policies seek to have overbroad disclosure obligations that discourage participation because they implicitly require companies to engage in patent searches in order to avoid severe penalties for inadvertently failing to make a disclosure. (...) Resolves: 1) that the Participating Standards Organizations of GSC: · strongly support the adoption of effective intellectual property policies that are transparent, widely accepted and encourage broad-based participation and the contribution of valuable technical solutions by respecting intellectual property rights, including the right of the intellectual property holder to receive reasonable and adequate compensation for the shared use of its technology; · strongly voice their opposition to policies that mandate compensation-free licensing provisions and licensing practices that discriminate between members and non-members; and · strongly voice their opposition to intellectual property policies (a) with overbroad patent disclosure obligations that explicitly or implicitly mandate corporate patent searches with the penalty of loss of patent enforcement rights in connection with the relevant standard or (b) permit any group discussion of licensing terms during the standards development organization’s meetings or activities. ________________ Page 1 of 3
Language:English
Score: 964305.2 - https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/g...Res%2022%20IPR%20Policies.docx
Data Source: un
RESOLUTION {previously GSC-12/22} GSC-13/XX: (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policies (Status) RESOLUTION GSC-15/22: (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policies (reaffirmed) The 15th Global Standards Collaboration meeting (Beijing, September 2010) Recognizing: a) That effective standardization utilizes intellectual property rights policies that encourage participation, respect the contribution of valuable intellectual property, and result in standards that are technically proficient and widely accepted; b) that such intellectual property rights policies typically provide incentives to interoperate, innovate and compete by: · respecting intellectual property, · balancing the interests of all stakeholders so that the outcomes are representative, inclusive and more broadly supported, · being open and transparent for all to review and understand, · promoting the use of the best technical solutions given commercial requirements, · being consistent with internationally accepted norms such as widely accepted RAND/FRAND-based intellectual property rights policies, · recognizing the right of intellectual property right holders to receive reasonable and adequate compensation for the shared use of their technology; c) that such effective intellectual property rights policies (i) encourage participation in standardization and the contribution of valuable technology, (ii) stimulate the sharing and adoption of technological advances that otherwise would be outside the relevant IPR policy, (iii) stimulate innovation, both in terms of the interoperability technology and also additional, non-standard features to accommodate customer needs and consumer choice, and (iv) solve interoperability challenges in effective ways that are focused and well-defined while preventing splintering (which can undermine the primary interoperability objective); d) that such effective intellectual property rights policies do not discourage either collaboration or widespread acceptance because they do not (1) mandate corporate patent searches, (2) impose unreasonable disclosure obligations, (3) seek to impose inflexible licensing commitments on intellectual property holders or (4) permit any group discussion of licensing terms during the standards development organization’s meetings or activities; e) that the intellectual property rights policies of the majority of standards development organizations include provisions for standards users to license standards-essential intellectual property under RAND/FRAND compensatory or compensation-free (e.g. royalty free) terms and conditions; f) that there is a trend in some user communities and some standards development organizations in support of patent policies with enforced compensation-free provisions for standards implementers; g) that there are some standards development organizations whose intellectual property rights policies are exclusive to members and discriminatory to non-members; h) that not all intellectual property holders are members/participants of standards development organizations; and i) that some intellectual property policies seek to have overbroad disclosure obligations that discourage participation because they implicitly require companies to engage in patent searches in order to avoid severe penalties for inadvertently failing to make a disclosure. (...) Resolves: 1) that the Participating Standards Organizations of GSC: · strongly support the adoption of effective intellectual property policies that are transparent, widely accepted and encourage broad-based participation and the contribution of valuable technical solutions by respecting intellectual property rights, including the right of the intellectual property holder to receive reasonable and adequate compensation for the shared use of its technology; · strongly voice their opposition to policies that mandate compensation-free licensing provisions and licensing practices that discriminate between members and non-members; and · strongly voice their opposition to intellectual property policies (a) with overbroad patent disclosure obligations that explicitly or implicitly mandate corporate patent searches with the penalty of loss of patent enforcement rights in connection with the relevant standard or (b) permit any group discussion of licensing terms during the standards development organization’s meetings or activities. ____________ Page 1 of 2
Language:English
Score: 964305.2 - https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/it.../21/06/T21060000040029MSWE.doc
Data Source: un
It is alleged that "between June 1992 and July 1993, Pasko Ljubicic individually and in concert with members of the HVO Military Police who were under his command and control, and with members of the HVO, planned, instigated, ordered committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime against humanity by persecuting Bosnian Muslims on political, racial, or religious grounds throughout the municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca, or knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to do the same, or had done so, and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof". Also according to the indictment, persecutions were perpetrated by the widespread and systematic attacks on towns and villages inhabited by Bosnian Muslims within the municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca.
Language:English
Score: 964305.2 - https://www.icty.org/en/sid/7934
Data Source: un
It is alleged that "between June 1992 and July 1993, Pasko Ljubicic individually and in concert with members of the HVO Military Police who were under his command and control, and with members of the HVO, planned, instigated, ordered committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime against humanity by persecuting Bosnian Muslims on political, racial, or religious grounds throughout the municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca, or knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to do the same, or had done so, and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof". According to the indictment, persecutions were perpetrated by the widespread and systematic attacks on towns and villages inhabited by Bosnian Muslims within the municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca.
Language:English
Score: 964305.2 - https://www.icty.org/en/sid/7943
Data Source: un
RESOLUTION {previously GSC-12/22} GSC-13/XX: (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policies (Status) Draft RESOLUTION GSC-14/22 {previously GSC-13/22}: (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policies (unchanged/modified/deleted) The 14th Global Standards Collaboration meeting (Geneva, July 2009) Recognizing: a) That effective standardization utilizes intellectual property rights policies that encourage participation, respect the contribution of valuable intellectual property, and result in standards that are technically proficient and widely accepted; b) that such intellectual property rights policies typically provide incentives to interoperate, innovate and compete by: · respecting intellectual property, · balancing the interests of all stakeholders so that the outcomes are representative, inclusive and more broadly supported, · being open and transparent for all to review and understand, · promoting the use of the best technical solutions given commercial requirements, · being consistent with internationally accepted norms such as widely accepted RAND/FRAND-based intellectual property rights policies, · recognizing the right of intellectual property right holders to receive reasonable and adequate compensation for the shared use of their technology; c) that such effective intellectual property rights policies (i) encourage participation in standardization and the contribution of valuable technology, (ii) stimulate the sharing and adoption of technological advances that otherwise would be outside the relevant IPR policy, (iii) stimulate innovation, both in terms of the interoperability technology and also additional, non-standard features to accommodate customer needs and consumer choice, and (iv) solve interoperability challenges in effective ways that are focused and well-defined while preventing splintering (which can undermine the primary interoperability objective); d) that such effective intellectual property rights policies do not discourage either collaboration or widespread acceptance because they do not (1) mandate corporate patent searches, (2) impose unreasonable disclosure obligations, (3) seek to impose inflexible licensing commitments on intellectual property holders or (4) permit any group discussion of licensing terms during the standards development organization’s meetings or activities; e) that the intellectual property rights policies of the majority of standards development organizations include provisions for standards users to license standards-essential intellectual property under RAND/FRAND compensatory or compensation-free (e.g. royalty free) terms and conditions; f) that there is a trend in some user communities and some standards development organizations in support of patent policies with enforced compensation-free provisions for standards implementers; g) that there are some standards development organizations whose intellectual property rights policies are exclusive to members and discriminatory to non-members; h) that not all intellectual property holders are members/participants of standards development organizations; and i) that some intellectual property policies seek to have overbroad disclosure obligations that discourage participation because they implicitly require companies to engage in patent searches in order to avoid severe penalties for inadvertently failing to make a disclosure. (...) Resolves: 1) that the Participating Standards Organizations of GSC: · strongly support the adoption of effective intellectual property policies that are transparent, widely accepted and encourage broad-based participation and the contribution of valuable technical solutions by respecting intellectual property rights, including the right of the intellectual property holder to receive reasonable and adequate compensation for the shared use of its technology; · strongly voice their opposition to policies that mandate compensation-free licensing provisions and licensing practices that discriminate between members and non-members; and · strongly voice their opposition to intellectual property policies (a) with overbroad patent disclosure obligations that explicitly or implicitly mandate corporate patent searches with the penalty of loss of patent enforcement rights in connection with the relevant standard or (b) permit any group discussion of licensing terms during the standards development organization’s meetings or activities. ____________ Page 1 of 2
Language:English
Score: 964305.2 - https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/it.../21/05/T21050000050022MSWE.doc
Data Source: un